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CAPE VERDE AND THE ATLANTIC SPACE
Francisco Proença Garcia1
Introduction
 Traditionally when we look at the World Map it is usual to see the Mer-
cator cylindrical map projection, centered on the Euro-Atlantic region; but in 
Geopolitics we know that there are several perspectives of the same geograph-
ical reality, and that the center of the Map is chosen according to our notion of 
belonging to a certain space. And in the background, different historical expe-
riences result in distinct interest narratives and normative preferences in com-
merce or security. For example, Nicholas Spykman (1969), in a fine extension 
of the Thomas Mahan tradition, considered in his analysis the American Con-
tinent as central, demonstrating how it holds a favorable geographic position 
because it is facing the two oceans (the Atlantic and the Pacific) which gives it 
access to the main commercial routes of the world.
 In International Relations and Geopolitics it is common to say nowa-
days that there was a transition from the centrality of the political and economic 
power of the Euro-Atlantic area to the Asia-Pacific region (Nye 2014; Biscop et al. 
2015). But in our approach our objective is to show that there is a reaffirmation 
of the Atlantic Space, especially by maintaining the geoeconomic importance of 
the European Community by the new dynamism of the transatlantic link, but 
above all by the interest shown by the emerging and re-emergent powers in the 
South Atlantic.
 In this scenario, Cape Verde has an integrating role throughout the At-
lantic Space due to its geographic location that strengthens several belongings. 
The country is a member of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and has a Special Partnership with the European Union (EU); at 
the same time it is a part of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries 
(CPLP) and has hosted military exercises of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
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zation (NATO) in its territory, reason enough to shift our curiosity towards a 
geopolitical study relating this archipelago of the African coast with the Atlantic 
Space.
The Atlantic Space
 From a geographical point of view, the Atlantic space encompasses 86 
million and 560 thousand square kilometers, or 23.9% of the land surface, 
covering 30 countries in the Americas, 11 in Europe and 24 in Africa (Correia 
2010), all of them very heterogeneous from the political, economic, social and 
cultural point of view.
 This immense body of water connecting the North Pole to the Ant-
arctic includes the Gulf of Mexico, the North, Baltic, Caribbean, Black and 
Mediterranean Seas, and it is possible to consider six accesses: two in the 
north (northeast and northwest), two in the center (the Panama Canal and the 
Strait of Gibraltar) and two in the south (Drake Passage, Cape of Good Hope), 
having its smaller width between Natal (Brazil) and Freetown (Sierra Leone), 
defining the line that joins these two points as the geopolitical equator (Cor-
reia 2010).
 The vast space of the Atlantic Basin is characterized by its accentuated 
heterogeneity parallel to increasing factors of interdependence. In this space, 
we find a community of shared values such as democracy and free trade, 
which coexist with different political, economic, social and cultural traditions 
in different regions and countries (Grevi 2016). In the Atlantic space, we find 
different levels of economic development, institutional and security stabili-
ty, ideologies, religious cleavages, family organizations and interpretations of 
values such as the Human Rights.
 From the geopolitical point of view, the North Atlantic is more homo-
geneous than the Middle or South Atlantic, characterizing the so-called West, 
a shared community of common values.
Political Regimes and Systems
 Analyzing the map from a point of view of regimes and political sys-
tems we find that in the Atlantic area, most countries are democracies, more 
precisely 62 democracies, 12 regimes considered hybrids and 7 authoritarian 
regimes (Gratius 2015); in Europe, democratic regimes predominate (88% of 
countries), with a smaller percentage in America (only 2/3 of countries) and 
only 20% of countries are considered democracies in Atlantic Africa, 43% are 
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autocracies and 37% are hybrid regimes (Gratius 2015)2.
 On the other hand, we also verified the existence of a multiplicity of 
political units in a fragile condition (weak, failed or collapsed). According to 
the Fund for Peace index of 2016, in the Atlantic Basin there are 12 political 
units in this situation, of which 11 are in Africa and one in the Caribbean, 
Haiti3.
Economy and resources
 
 The economic and investment interdependence in the Atlantic basin 
has been increasing since the beginning of the century. Its intensity varies, 
since there is great diversification and differentiation of the economies. Be-
tween North America and Europe, trade accounts for 40% of the total cross-
ing the Atlantic, followed by EU-Africa trade (21%) and between North and 
South and Central America trade (18%) (Grevi 2016).
 Figure 1 represents the traffic of ships in the several existing maritime 
lines of communication, with a higher density between the two development 
poles in the North Atlantic, USA and Europe, which reflects the commercial 
dynamics between the two margins, but we can also verify a significant South-
North sea traffic, for example, the one expressed in the figure, which portrays 
the density of traffic between Brazil and the rest of the world.
Figure 1 – Domains of maritime circulation
Source: European Union External Action 2014.
2 For further statistical data, check https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-
-world-2016.
3 For further data, see http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/.
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Maritime traffic in the Maritime Communication Lines (Linhas de Co-
municações Marítimas, LCM) of the Brazilian coast accounts for an average of 
359 daily merchant ships (MS/d) and annually moves more than 350 billion 
dollars. Among these, can be highlighted:
Figure 2 – Major Brazilian Maritime Communication Lines (LCM) 
that cross the South Atlantic
• LCM with Europe and North Africa, with 215 MS/d;
• LCM with North America, the Caribbean and northern South America, 
with 68 MS/d;
• LCM with the Brazilian coast, with 3 59 MS/d;
• LCM with the Gulf of Guinea (central Africa), with 40 MS/d;
• LCM with the Southern Cone and the Pacific Ocean, with 77 MS/d;
• LCM with southern Africa, the Middle East, and Asia through the Cape of 
Good Hope (Cape Route), with 65 MS/d.
Source: Guerra 2011.
 Despite the significant numerical expression, the South Atlantic is 
still considered an ocean of transit (Correia, 2010), and the main routes are 
along the American and African coast. It should be noted, however, that the 
main South-North routes cross the geopolitical equator and pass close to 
Cape Verde, which highlights the importance of this and other Macaronesia 
(Azores, Canary Islands and Madeira) archipelagos.
 In a region that can be considered its energy system, the Atlantic 
Space possesses a large part of unexplored fossil reserves, including 40% of 
the oil, 20% of the natural gas and 40% of the world coal (BP 2015), also 
having 67% of the technically recoverable reserves of shale gas, 77% of the 
installed capacity of solar energy, 64% of the wind energy and 59% of the 
geothermal energy (Kraemer and Stefes 2016).
 The largest proven oil reserves are concentrated in the Americas and 
part of the Atlantic Africa. In Brazil, for example, oil reserves will be about 46 
billion barrels, with the possibility of reaching 70 to 100 billion oil barrels, in 
addition to a large volume of gas; in Venezuela, the reserves are estimated at 
80 billion barrels (Hanson 2008).
 In the region of the Gulf of Guinea, oil production accounts for about 
16% of the world production. In this unstable region, almost all the oil fields 
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are located offshore, which guarantees them some security, away from the 
instability that ravages the continental area (Guedes 2013). This region also 
includes the Congo Basin (the second largest water and forest complex in the 
world after the Amazon), which covers nearly two million square kilometers.
Threats to Security
 There are also several threats to transnational security in the Atlantic, 
the most serious being the previously mentioned weakness of the State. The 
weakness of the State can and should be related to the other threats, since, 
having no power or control over the whole of its territory, States are permea-
ble to the germination and development of the most diverse forms of subver-
sion (Garcia and Ferro 2013).
 Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs), with the funds gen-
erated, acquire a level of power that competes with the States of the region. 
They express this power by the ability to create various forms of instability in 
the countries they operate, wide-ranging instability, from social to econom-
ic, from political to psychological. At the same time, they attempt to indi-
rectly gain political power through the corruption of their sovereign organs 
and their officials, in order to intimidate the established power to guarantee 
complete freedom of action in their criminal activities. This situation further 
undermines the weak State structures.
 In the west bank, we can highlight the criminal violence of the drug 
cartels and the thousands of deaths caused by their actions4. Countries such 
as Guatemala, Honduras, or Mexico struggle to contain the high levels of vio-
lent crime that affect state authority (Grevi, 2016).
 In West Africa, a region where most countries are among the world’s 
poorest, drug trafficking is estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars. Drug 
trafficking networks often take advantage of the structural weaknesses of 
countries such as Guinea-Bissau and, with the approval of local elites, have 
turned the region into a significant transit center for Europe’s distribution 
route5.
 In the 2014 report of the West Africa Commission on Drugs, data pre-
4 According to the Global Burden of Armed Violence 2015, published by the Geneva Declara-
tion on Armed Violence and Development (2015), Central and South America, the Caribbean 
and South Africa lead in the number of violent deaths.
5 On this subject, the details are in the 2014 report of the West Africa Commission on Drugs, 
which analyzes the transformation of Guinea Bissau into a major drug center distribution in 
West Africa: http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/report.
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sented for 2010 shows that most of the cocaine flow from Latin America to 
West Africa this year crossed the Cape Verde archipelago from where it was 
headed for the coast Atlantic region; from this analysis it can also be conclud-
ed that Cape Verde is one of the main points of transit between Latin America 
and the African continent.
 Despite this weakness, Cape Verde is considered a success story on the 
African continent in terms of socioeconomic development and democratic re-
silience, somehow a pole of stability in a volatile region (Santos, 2014). How-
ever, there have been major funding difficulties, particularly for the training 
of its security forces and services. However, this vulnerability is being covered 
by international aid, including the inauguration in 2010 of the US-funded 
Maritime Safety Operations Center (Centro de Operações de Segurança Maríti-
ma, COSMAR).
 These threats are also related to Regional Levels of Conflict. There 
are numerous conflicts in the Atlantic space, and just to mention the most 
relevant ones: in the Middle East we have the persistent Israeli-Palestinian 
problem, the Syrian civil war, and in Iraq, where Daesh asserts itself as a 
subversive phenomenon on a global scale; in Europe, the problems with Rus-
sia remain due to the situation in Ukraine and Georgia; in Turkey, beyond 
internal convulsions, there is the Cyprus issue and again the Kurdistan prob-
lem; in North Africa there remains the issue of the status of Western Sahara, 
conflicts in Libya, Mali and all manifestations of instability and insecurity in 
the Sahel; in sub-Saharan Africa we highlight all the conflict in Nigeria, both 
around the Niger Delta and the Boko Haram; and we should mention the 
humanitarian disaster in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where violence 
is endemic.
 In the Gulf of Guinea space, piracy represents a clear example of threat 
that can endanger Western economic and energy security, since this crimi-
nal activity prevents the free circulation of goods (among which hydrocarbon 
ones) in the lines of maritime communication. The piracy phenomenon that 
manifests itself nowadays in the Gulf of Guinea is responsible for 600 at-
tacks from 2002 till 2012, severely affecting local economy and port activities 
(Grevi 2016). In 2012, the Nigerian government estimated that 400.00 bar-
rels were stolen daily, at a total monthly cost of one million dollars (Chatham 
House 2013).
 It is interesting to notice that the TCOs that operate in the region, 
searching for some support of the people, take on some forms of social re-
sponsibility, replacing the States in the construction of roads, schools and 
hospitals.
 In addition, in Africa there are economic disparities and exponential 
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population growth. This breeding ground on the West African coast raises 
factors that ultimately encourage irregular immigration, forcing populations 
to move in search of safety and welfare.
 The migratory element (as a generator of tension and some instabil-
ity), with the flow oriented predominantly to the Western countries, where 
the new communities are hardly integrated in the local societies, increases 
the expansion of disenchanted and potential affiliates and Combatants for the 
alternative presented by global subversion.
 Irregular immigration, from which the TCOs take advantage, leads 
to the exploitation of human misery. Look at the dramatic situations of those 
who seek in the European dream to lessen their misery. In the boats that go to 
the north bank of the Mediterranean or to the Canaries we find people from 
all over the African continent. They come mainly from West Africa, but also 
from Sudan, Chad, Horn of Africa and even from Southern Africa. These 
immigrants in search of security and welfare are at great risk of life. Many of 
them cannot remain in the transit countries, which become their final desti-
nation. They even stay for years and stage their “jump operation”, which also 
allows them to have several informal jobs during the trip, which will ensure 
them to pay for the next step (IOM 2005).
 The migratory phenomenon accompanies the Cape Verdean people, 
and it is inevitable to speak of this phenomenon when talking about the coun-
try. Today, as a result of the emigration of several decades ago mainly to Eu-
rope, the United States, and Africa, the country has a large diaspora spread 
around the world and estimated at around 500 thousand citizens (Cardoso 
2006). That is, accordingly to the 2010 census, a number similar to those in 
the archipelago6, which strengthens the idea of a global nation in the foreign 
policy of this small state and serves as a “link in the integration of Cape Verde 
internationally” (Madeira 2016).
 Human mobility also enhances the transfer and sharing of knowl-
edge and culture. In the case of Cape Verde, its diaspora can be considered “a 
transnational community because emigrants function as a link between Cape 
Verde and the rest of the world. They support a social relationship between 
the host country and the country of origin” (Cardoso 2011), providing an im-
portant contribution to the country’s economy with its remittances, while also 
bringing new business models based in the learning achieved in the countries 
of destination (Ridout and Goerg 2016).
6 According to data from the 2010 Census, the Cape Verdean population was 491,875 resi-
dents, more about this subject can be found in the website  http://www.ine.cv/dadostats/dados.
aspx?d=1
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 With the economic and financial crisis and the instability that has 
plagued several countries in the region, Cape Verde has also become a des-
tination country for emigration, mainly due to free movement policies for 
ECOWAS citizens. This situation contributes greatly to the intellectual, polit-
ical and academic debate about the country’s integration in that community 
(Madeira 2013), its economic impact, but above all the cultural and identity 
impact.
International Organizations
 
 The Atlantic space represents one of the most integrated regions due 
to the role played by several International Organizations, of the most diverse 
purposes. Without being exhaustive: the European Union (EU), the African 
Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
the Community of Portuguese Language Speaking Countries (CPLP), the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the South Atlantic Peace and 
Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS). These organizations eventually constituted a 
network of platforms that connect these Atlantic countries and, concomitant-
ly, “contributed to the diversification of foreign relations for many countries 
of the global South” (Ridout and Goerg 2016).
 In our essay, only three of these International Organizations that pos-
sess relevant politics and practices to the Atlantic security will be addressed.
 
The European Union
 The Atlantic, which characterizes EU’s western frontier, is the great 
maritime space that defines two thirds of European borders, involving four 
seas (the Baltic, the North, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea) and many 
archipelagos, with some of them being considered as in an ultra-outlying po-
sition, such as Reunion, Guyana, Madeira and Martinique.
 The sea has a significant value in the European economy, since the 
maritime regions represent 40% of Europe’s GDP. The EU also owns 40% 
of the maritime transport’s global fleet. One clear example of the importance 
that the bloc attributes to the sea is the existence of six agencies whose main 
concern are sea issues (Frontex, EDA, EMSA, EEA, ACCP, ESA) (Correia 
2010), still existing a handful of diverse politics regarding the sea, in which 
we can emphasize the Blue Book (an EU integrated maritime policy), the At-
lantic Action Plan, and the Maritime Security Strategy.
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 The execution of the strategy to the Atlantic defined by the European 
Commission demands a great effort by communitarian institutions, member 
States and even private entities. In the Atlantic Action Plan, to be executed 
until 2020, there is the establishment of the priorities regarding the inves-
tigation, the investment and the reinforcement of competences, which the 
States may follow as to promote the “blue economy” in the Atlantic region, in 
a sustainable and inclusive way in the coastal regions.
 The Atlantic is vital for EU’s security and welfare; besides the threats 
and the risks manifested in the maritime global dominium, we must consid-
er that it is through the sea that EU processes 90% of its international trade 
and 40% of its internal one (Rodrigues 2014). The EU strongly depends on 
the import of petroleum (88.4%) and gas (65.3%) derived especially from the 
Middle East and from the Eurasia (Eurostat 2015), being, however, passing 
through a process of diversifying its supplying sources, including the Atlan-
tic, in such a way that the imports from Africa have grown from 18% to 23% 
between the years of 2006 and 2014; only in 2014, Europe represented 45% 
and 20% of the Nigerian and the Angolan exports, respectively (Grevi 2016). 
In this way, it is imperative to guarantee the freedom of circulation in the sea 
and the security of its supply.
 The goal of the Maritime Security Strategy, adopted in 2014, consists 
in the defense of the maritime interests that Europe needs to safeguard in 
the nearby sea area (the one concerning the spaces under the state members’ 
jurisdiction and its proximities in the high sea), as well as further maritime 
interests (the security of vital navigation routes, transportation and distribu-
tion networks) that may be threatened (Rodrigues 2014).
 This strategy aims to enhance EU´s response and it integrates five ar-
eas of action: external action; maritime alert; vigilance and information shar-
ing; capacity enhancement; risk management and protection of critical mar-
itime infrastructures; crisis response and, also, innovation and investigation 
in maritime security, education and training.
 The greatest “systemic” threat, nonetheless, is not a result of the cur-
rent competition between the great powers. On the European side, it is pos-
sible to verify a severe identity crisis of the EU as a relevant Organization. In 
this sense, one can consider that one of the most significant threats is the in-
ternal one, and it embodies the renationalization of its External and Common 
Security and Defense Politics (CSDP).
 In a period when memory and history impose themselves upon the 
treaties, in which we witness at the same time movements against the integra-
tion and favorable to the self-exclusion in the EU, we shall properly analyze 
the consequences brought by such phenomenon to European security and 
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defense.
 The EU has adopted, still, a joint strategy with the AU, based on the 
principles of belonging and joint responsibility, as well as it has developed sev-
eral dialogue and cooperation mechanisms in partnership with sub regional 
African organizations. In the security scope, there are numerous initiatives7, 
particularly in the West Africa and the Sahel regions, involving the ECOWAS, 
in order to contain the illicit traffic, the piracy and the terrorism. It also had 
a prominent role in supporting the definition of an African Peace and Secu-
rity Architecture (APSA) and in projecting military forces under CSDP in 
support of reforms on both the security and the defense sector in Niger and 
Mali. 
 Moreover, as it will be further seen, the US and Brazil are also con-
ducting naval exercises in the west African coast involving regional navies, 
contributing, therefore, to their training and capacity building.
 In Africa’s Atlantic coast, the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), 
which comprises eight countries of the region, also has an important role, 
especially in the coordination and information exchange, contributing to re-
gional maritime security.
 
NATO
 
 It is mandatory to talk about the Atlantic Alliance whereas speaking 
of security in the Atlantic, which represents a regional alliance with global 
interests, but that is, also, par excellence, the promoter of the transatlantic 
connection, maintaining its position as Europe’s most important security 
mechanism.
 NATO, aiming at guaranteeing its interests, since its creation, ensures 
the control of the sea, at least in the North Atlantic. Nowadays, however, in the 
current maritime security environment, as non-State threats begin to arise 
and as Russia reemerged, the Alliance, through a maritime strategy adopted 
in 2011, sought to not only enhance its contribution to defense and security, 
but also to promote its values. This strategy materializes through its naval op-
erations in four areas: dissuasion and collective defense; crisis management; 
cooperative security; and maritime security. Regarding the maritime security 
itself, always within the strict respect of the law, NATO is able to watch and 
patrol any area defined by the Council, as well as to contribute to the energetic 
7 The EU Gulf of Guinea Action Plan 2015-2020 and the Sahel Action Plan 2015-2020 are 
examples of such.
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security, being here included critical infrastructures and maritime communi-
cation lines (NATO 2011).
 It is worth mentioning that Cape Verde also has a strategic impor-
tance for NATO. We may here recall that, in 2005, the then Minister of For-
eign Affairs from Bulgaria, Salomon Passy, formally proposed the inclusion 
of the State of Cape Verde in the Atlantic Alliance; furthermore, in July 2006, 
NATO managed to fulfill the firsts military exercises in Africa, namely the 
exercise Steadfast Jaguar (Guedes 2012).
 
ZOPACAS
 
 In the Security and Defense scope, Cape Verde is still part of another 
international organization with interests in the South Atlantic, ZOPACAS.
 ZOPACAS, created by a Brazilian initiative during the 1986 Unit-
ed Nations General Assembly, comprises 24 countries. Such organization is 
characterized for being more like a forum “to discuss the management of 
the South Atlantic space than a military or political entity” (Ridout and Goerg 
2016) and has as its main objective the promotion of regional cooperation and 
the maintenance of peace and security in the South Atlantic region. Besides 
cooperation initiatives, initiatives of political-diplomatic character stand out, 
particularly in protecting the environment, avoiding the nuclear proliferation 
and finding pacific solutions to conflicts between the integrating parties.
 ZOPACAS is not a regional integration organization, presenting it-
self more as a structure that gathers all the countries of the region, fomenting 
cooperation and interaction agreements in the South Atlantic, than a space 
for joint action (Guerra 2011). The organization arose revitalized in 2013, after 
the VII Ministerial Reunion in Montevideo, inserted in a context in which 
Brazil had already discovered its oil fields in the Pre-Salt layers, in São Paulo’s 
seacoast; in which the US resurrected its IV fleet, almost 60 years after its 
dissolution in 1950; and finally, in which an increasing presence of China in 
South America can be verified.
 The VII ZOPACAS’ Ministerial Meeting took place at city of Min-
delo, in Cape Verde, between May 20 and 21 2015, having the participants 
approached cooperation subjects in the areas of maritime security, oceano-
graphic investigation, maritime transportation, university cooperation and 
technological information and communication (Panapress 2015).
 In this complex context of struggling for the affirmation in the South 
Atlantic space, Brazil invested in a cooperation with a “South-South” charac-
ter, and the progressive reinforcement of ZOPACAS’ role was relevant, as 
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well as the role of other forums, such as the IBAS (India, Brazil and South 
Africa). The maritime cooperation between Brazilian, Argentinian, Uruguay-
an and South African navies had established itself as a reality due to the regu-
lar naval exercises, such as the ATLASUR and the IBASMAR, which, during 
2008 and 2010, jointly exercised IBAS forum’s naval forces (Pereira 2013).
 In spite of these cooperation actions, there is still a gap in an institu-
tional articulation of both the Atlantic margins, through which circulate the 
most diverse threats.
 
The South Atlantic
 The Atlantic continues to be of great interest to the US, considering 
that the country possesses five different command fighters responsible for 
significant areas of the ocean (EUCOM, AFRICOM, CENTCOM, SOUTH-
COM, NORTHCOM), as well as three fleets that project its naval power in the 
region: the second, the fourth and the sixth fleets.
 More recently, the South Atlantic has brought to light new US inter-
ests in the area, leading to the creation of AFRICOM in 2008, and the rear-
rangement of the fourth fleet, in order to lessen the country’s progressive loss 
of hegemony in the region. These interests are not apart from the oil reserves’ 
discovery in the Brazilian offshore and in many of the Guinea Gulf countries, 
both of which, besides representing local supplying alternatives, have also 
a more persistent stability when compared to the traditional sources in the 
Middle East and the Central Asia, that are subject to significant and recurring 
convulsions.
 Completing the diversity of interest here addressed, one can add 
Angola’s ambitions to achieve its oceanic capability (Correia 2015), and we 
can also ask who, from a military perspective, controls the Atlantic space? 
If, in one hand, in the North we may consider NATO or even the US, in the 
South, on the other, despite Brazilian intentions in this oceanic space, there 
is a significant set of islands under British sovereignty: Ascension, St. Hele-
na, Tristan da Cunha, South Georgia and South Sandwich and Falkland, that 
form an arc that disputes with Brazil this space. Moreover, as the holder of 
such islands, the United Kingdom still claims thousands of square miles at 
the bottom of the ocean.
 The reactivation of the fourth fleet without any previous consultation 
of regional partners had not been taken for granted by a number of South At-
lantic states. From a Brazilian point of view, such move figures a threat to the 
maritime oil reserves. Some authors, such as Moniz Bandeira (2008), sug-
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gest the deflagration of a second Cold War, involving South America, “where 
US’ penetration constitutes an element of instability and concern”. Then, the 
Brazilian president, Lula da Silva, stated that “when the US established as 
a priority the reinforcement of the Atlantic’s Fourth Fleet, we must clearly 
worry. The country allegedly does it for humanitarian reasons, but we did not 
ask for this, nor did anyone”. In this sense, Brazil’s president engaged on the 
re-equipment of Brazilian Armed Forces, on the enhancement of defense in-
dustries and also on a concrete proposal to UNASUR regarding the creation 
of a regional defense organism, the South American Defense Council (Fonse-
ca 2011).
 During Lula’s presidency, Brazil approved, in 2005, a new National 
Defense Policy and, in 2008, the National Defense Strategy, through which 
the defense priorities to both the green and the blue Amazon are highlighted. 
The country has also assumed the position of maritime power in the South 
Atlantic, being the main driving force of South-American regionalism and 
South-South cooperation (Grevi 2016). At the corporate level, for instance, 
construction, mining and agro-industrial companies’ investment in Africa 
was notorious, especially in Angola; Brazil’s diplomatic network more than 
doubled since 2002, currently counting with thirty-eight official representa-
tions, situation that contributes for the country to represent 70% of the trade 
between South America and Africa (Kotsopoulos 2014).
 In this sense, we may consider that South-South cooperation became 
a priority in Brazilian foreign policy agenda, as a way of promoting the coun-
try’s international insertion, and that such cooperation constitutes, nowadays, 
the essence of Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Aguilar 2013).
 One of the different types of cooperation is designated by the term 
“technical cooperation”, having its fundamentals on the technical support, 
counting with the sending of specialists in determinate sectors of activity in 
order to build capacity of the population in areas of knowledge with a lack of 
technical resources (Aguilar 2013).
 The technical-military cooperation also plays a major role: among oth-
ers, cooperation agreements have been signed with Cape Verde (1994), South 
Africa (2003), Guinea-Bissau (2006), Namibia (2009), Nigeria, Senegal, An-
gola and Equatorial Guinea (2010), besides the already mentioned naval exer-
cises between both sides of the Atlantic. It is also worth pointing out that, in 
CPLP’s scope, there exercises from the Operation Felino series and periodical 
meetings involving the Defense Ministers and Chiefs of State.
 Moreover, Brazil has established a strategic cooperation with South 
Africa, in 2007, and with Angola, in 2010. In the economic level, MERCO-
SUR (Southern Common Market) and SADC (South African Development 
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Community) concluded, in 2009, preferential trade arrangements (Grevi 
2006).
 In the South Atlantic, it is still important to consider the diverse in-
terests of various political units regarding the extension of the maritime plat-
form, which, in the Brazilian case, concerns the so-called Blue Amazon, that, 
roughly speaking, corresponds to an increase of 50% of its territorial exten-
sion. In this vast space the south region of the Atlantic is located and it is still 
possible to evidence divergent interpretations regarding the border delimita-
tion between UK’s and Argentina’s sovereignty in the region of the Falklands/
Malvinas. Such position contrasts with the one in West Africa, where six8 
countries gathered to jointly request and mutually recognize its pretensions 
of expanding its continental shelf.
 In the level of language at the Atlantic’s space, several lingua fran-
cas (English, Spanish, Portuguese and French) are expressed, which facilitate 
the communication between the numerous political units and its respective 
populations, promoting the socialization and the negotiations, and being also 
significant forums of cooperation among the Atlantic countries9. In the South 
Atlantic, the “Oceano Moreno” by Adriano Moreira (1993), the presence of the 
Portuguese language is more expressive in the virtuous Brazil-Cape Verde-An-
gola triangle.
  In this sense, we may consider that such space has Lusophony in its 
center and, furthermore, that the CPLP sought to play a distinctive role on 
the definition of development and cooperation policies, as well as on the deci-
sion-making process of creating a stable security architecture.
Cape Verde in the Atlantic space
 When speaking of Cape Verde in the complex, heterogeneous and 
dynamic context of the Atlantic space, it is important to remind the geopolit-
ical author Spykman (IAEM 1982), for whom “the geography is the most im-
portant factor of the national power, because it is the most permanent one”, 
being also important to remember that the geopolitical value of a determinate 
space is only circumstantial and depends on the importance attributed by 
other states (Correia 2010).
8 These six countries are Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Sierra 
Leone. Regarding this subject, more details can be found in http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
clcs_new/submissions_files/wa775_14/wa7_es_en_sept2014.pdf.
9 Regarding more specifically the Portuguese language, we can mention an important study 
conducted by Luís Reto (2012), about the economic potential of the Portuguese language.
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 This small archipelagic country, situated 500 km from African west 
coast, possesses a territory of 4033 km2 and has approximately 500,000 in-
habitants. Such characteristics impose to Cape Verde great challenges in the 
political context, both regional and internationally.
 The first great challenge is the one of affirmation and even survival. 
In this challenge, we can also include the issue of belonging whether to Eu-
rope or to Africa10. This debate, that has been going on for decades, is far from 
being consensual in Cape Verde.
  If we approach this issue exclusively from a geographic perspective, 
the country is closer to Africa; nevertheless, the notion of belonging includes 
other factors, such as identity and culture ⸻both perennial in geopolitics. 
Cabral and his contemporaries have always defended africanity and, conse-
quently, a broader integration in the regional African context (Cabral 1978). 
This approach, however, does not represent a consensus, since that many ar-
gue in favor of a previous European identity and an integration into Western 
civilization (Madeira 2013).
 Nowadays, such debate focus on whether promote a stronger integra-
tion with ECOWAS or in the enhancement of the Special Partnership with 
UE, balancing its possible benefits and challenges. If the path chosen is the 
ECOWAS one, Cape Verde will become the only insular state to integrate 
a community of fifteen states and holder of approximately 250 millions of 
consumers (Monteiro 2016). However, the organization’s integration project 
is not yet consolidated, and the situation is aggravated by several cultural, 
religious and political difficulties among its members, as well as divergences 
regarding the free circulation of people, goods and capital. If the choice favors 
a greater regional African integration, the interaction of internal/external, ge-
opolitical, economic, demographic, cultural and religious factors will contin-
uously turn into a slow and complex process.
 The other option, the Special Partnership with EU, established in 
2007 (under Portuguese presidency), “represents a political approach that 
surpasses the mere relationship between the giver and the beneficiary” and 
does not constitute an alternative to the Cotonou Agreement. This partner-
ship embraces an action plan based on six pillars: good governance; security/
stability; regional integration; technical and normative convergence; knowl-
edge socialization; fight against poverty; and development (UE 2007).
 Since this Special Partnership takes into account regional integration, 
this will allow Cape Verde to establish a bridge between the two continents 
(Madeira 2015). On one hand it prioritizes closeness to further peripheral 
10 For further information, see Madeira 2013.
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regions and the rest of the Union, and on the other, a simultaneous intensifi-
cation of regional relations in the ECOWAS scope (UE 2007).
 Both of these options must pass through a process of reflection and 
evaluation of the opportunities and disadvantages. If a stage of greater inte-
gration is reached, one must create instruments that will minimize the coun-
try’s vulnerability and fight against phenomena that may endanger the archi-
pelago’s security and sovereignty (Madeira 2015).
 In our point of view, in an even more global world, in order to guar-
antee its freedom of action, Cape Verde must establish coherent, and, fore-
most, convenient alliances, improving multilateralism and “looking forward 
to the mobilization of comprehensive political-institutional solutions, capable 
of overpassing the vulnerabilities of an insular country” (Monteiro 2016), in 
such a way that reinforces its connections with Africa, Europe, Brazil, China, 
the US, CPLP and the South Atlantic.
 The second challenge is directly attached to the security issue, in 
which the combat against the most diverse forms of transnational organized 
crime is included. The socioeconomic development, considered as a third 
challenge, will only be fulfilled with a good governance and a deep institu-
tional consolidation, which are likely to drag foreign investors’ attention and, 
consequently, to significantly improve development.
Conclusion
 From the previous description, we may conclude that the Atlantic - 
notably an heterogeneous space, where challenges are complex, multidimen-
sional and globally scaled, and where there is a lack of institutional articula-
tion - had not lost its centrality to international relations, having, therefore, 
reaffirmed itself, both from an economic and from a security perspective.
 In order to preserve its differential, Cape Verde must keep the ad-
vantages brought by the images of good governance and political and social 
stability, also needs to gradually reduce its vulnerabilities throughout a multi-
plicity of partnerships, putting its sovereignty on service of the international 
community.
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ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to show that the centrality of the Atlantic continues to be a reality, 
above all, by maintaining the geo-economic importance of the European Community, 
by the new dynamism of the transatlantic link but mainly by the interest shown by 
emerging and re-emergent powers in the South Atlantic. In this context, Cape Verde 
plays in the Atlantic an interesting integrating role.
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